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Abstract
In this paper, we consider the problem of generating fair randomness in a deterministic, multi-
agent context (for instance, a decentralised game built on a blockchain). The existing state-of-the-
art approaches are either susceptible to manipulation if the stakes are high enough, or they are not
generally applicable (specifically for massive game worlds as opposed to games between a small set
of players). We propose a novel method based on game theory: By allowing agents to bet on the
outcomes of random events against the miners (who are ultimately responsible for the randomness),
we are able to align the incentives so that the distribution of random events is skewed only slightly
even if miners are trying to maximise their profit and engage in block withholding to cheat in games.
Keywords: Blockchain Gaming, Game Theory, Random-Number Generation, Block Withhold-
ing, Huntercoin
1 Introduction
With the creation of Bitcoin [10] in 2008, its pseudonymous inventor Satoshi Nakamoto solved a previ-
ously impossible problem: It became possible for fully decentralised P2P networks to reach consensus
about the current state of a distributed ledger. This allowed the creation of secure digital money without
any trusted intermediary, and was without doubt a revolutionary progress of technology.
But Nakamoto consensus is not limited to building cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin. The same mecha-
nism can be applied to reach consensus about other things as well in a decentralised setting. The first
such application was Namecoin [19], where Nakamoto consensus is used to establish who was the first to
register a particular name (e.g. a domain name or pseudonym) in the system and who is the “rightful”
owner of it. Recently, there has also been a lot of interest and activity in the field of blockchain games,
where Nakamoto consensus is applied to an online game. This idea was pioneered by Huntercoin [15] [22]
in 2014, and became widely known with the launch of CryptoKitties [6] in 2017.
In this paper, we want to tackle one problem of specific interest in blockchain games: How to produce
fair and secure random numbers. By the nature of blockchain systems and the need for a consensus
among network participants, all computations need to be deterministic. This includes events in games
that are meant to be “random”. Furthermore, since blockchain applications often involve monetary
stakes, it is important to produce random numbers in a way that cannot be manipulated or predicated,
giving unfair advantages to certain participants in a game.
There are currently two dominant approaches for the generation of random numbers in blockchain
games: They can be based off block hashes or a hash-commitment scheme can be used to generate
provably-fair random numbers among a well-defined set of players (e.g. a casino and a player). Both
methods, however, have certain drawbacks: The first can be manipulated by miners if the stake in a
game is high enough; the second is only applicable in some situations and, notably, not to MMO-type
games like Huntercoin. This will be discussed in more detail in Section 3.
In Section 4 below, we propose a novel alternative method, which is based on block hashes and
generally applicable, but uses a specific betting mechanism to punish dishonest miners. Our game-
theoretic analysis in Section 5 shows that this does, indeed, align miner incentives with those of players
of a blockchain game. (For the main result, see Theorem 15.) Manipulation of random numbers by
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miners is strongly discouraged, so that miners are much more honest and the game play will be much
fairer for everyone.
2 Blockchain Background
In this section, we want to give a brief overview of the blockchain background that is necessary for the
remainder of this paper. A more general description of the basic mechanisms employed by a blockchain
using Nakamoto consensus can be found in the seminal paper [10] or the more extensive book [1].
2.1 Proof-of-Work Mining
A blockchain is an append-only data structure, where new data (contained in blocks) is added over time
to the end of an ever-growing list of previous blocks. If a network participant (called a miner) wants to
append a new block to the list, they need to spend computational resources to produce a proof-of-work
(PoW); this is a data structure that is expensive to compute, but where other participants can cheaply
verify that a certain amount of computation was done to create it (see also [3]). In the case of Bitcoin
(and most other related blockchains based on this principle), such a PoW is computed by brute-forcing
a partial collision of a cryptographic hash function.
This process, called mining, is one of the key ingredients for the Nakamoto consensus: By having
to spend real-world resources (energy to power the computation), miners have an economic incentive
to behave “well” and produce a single chain of blocks that everyone agrees on rather than working on
different versions that compete with each other.
2.2 State Transitions
The blockchain as data structure and the mining process are ultimately used to allow the network to reach
consensus about some state. In the case of Bitcoin, this state is roughly speaking the current ledger of
bitcoin balances. (In reality, Bitcoin does not track individual “balances” but instead unspent transaction
outputs in the so-called UTXO set. But for the context of this paper, this technical distinction is not
important.)
This is achieved by coupling the current state with the blockchain through pre-defined rules for state
transitions: The blockchain with its consensus mechanism establishes a well-defined series of transactions
(requested changes to the state) made by the participants. For each new block of transactions that is
generated, the previous state is updated according to the state-transition rules based on the transactions
in that new block.
It is important to note here that the blockchain itself stores the transactions (i.e. actions by the
participants) and not the state. This is enough, since the state is uniquely defined already by the series
of transactions made and the state-transition rules, so that it can be computed independently and stored
as needed by every network participant.
The actual state-transition rules used in blockchain networks are quite diverse. For “basic” blockchains
like Bitcoin or Namecoin, they are relatively simple. In the case of Huntercoin, the state transition also
encodes the rules of the embedded game world, including harvesting of resources in the world and basic
combat between players. For Ethereum [5], state transitions are computed by executing Turing-complete
byte code on the EVM (Ethereum Virtual Machine), so that the state itself can contain arbitrary pro-
grams that determine further rules (similar to the von-Neumann architecture of modern computers).
It is even possible to use a single blockchain as the underlying storage layer for data that is then
used to compute multiple distinct states according to different rules. This is done by overlay protocols
like Mastercoin [20] (now called Omni Layer) or Counterparty [13]. The XAYA blockchain [8], which is
a generalisation of the Huntercoin model, is even specifically built to be the data layer for different sets
of state-transition rules. This is illustrated in Figure 1.
2.3 Blockchain Games
The network state and its state-transition rules as described above can now be used specifically to build
(multi-player online) games. Using a blockchain for this allows them to be run by the network as a whole,
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Figure 1: Illustration of a single blockchain storing transactions (bold outline) from which two different
states S1 and S2 associated to each block are computed according to two different sets of transition rules.
so that no central game server is needed and instead every participant computes the current state and
verifies that it is correct according to the game rules. This has various benefits, including provably-fair
game play and independence from central servers (that can be hacked, go down or simply be shut off by
the company running the game).
Note that the term “game” is used in a wide sense for the context of this paper: It can refer to MMO-
type worlds like Huntercoin, simple trading games like CryptoKitties, skill games or even gambling in
online casinos. Furthermore, such a game does not even need to be about entertainment. It can be a
purely economic interaction between agents, as long as there is a predefined and well-known set of rules
that govern it.
3 Random Events in Games
Let us now consider how the state-transition function used in a game can actually produce random
events. Randomness is important for many types of games, but on the other hand all state transitions
in a blockchain need to be fully deterministic and reproducible for every participant in the network.
The current state of the art for randomness in blockchain games is based on two quite different
approaches: Using the hash of the current block to seed a pseudo-random number generator for the state
computation, or using hash commitments directly between the players to generate random numbers that
are provably fair. In this section, we will discuss both of these approaches. It will turn out that both
have nice properties but also drawbacks, and that there are interesting applications for which neither is
fully suited.
3.1 Block Hashes and Block Withholding
Since the state transition cannot be really random, it can instead rely on a pseudo-random number
generator (PRNG). If the PRNG is seeded based on the hash of the current block, then the resulting
random numbers are unpredictable until the block has been mined. (If the same hash function is used for
the PoW algorithm and for seeding the PRNG, then the seed will have a bias towards low values. But
if that is a problem in a particular situation, it can be easily fixed by using two different hash functions
or, for instance, hashing the block hash again to compute the seed.)
This approach is straight-forward, and can be applied to introduce randomness into arbitrary state-
transition functions. Because of that, it is widely used for blockchain games. For instance, both Hunter-
coin (on its own blockchain) and CryptoKitties (on Ethereum) as well as many other games and online
casinos on the Ethereum platform apply this method.
Unfortunately, this method also has a big defect: Even though the outcome of random events is
not decided until the block is mined, the miner who produced the block still is the first who knows the
result. This means that he may decide to simply discard the block instead of publishing it, particularly
when the miner participates in a game as well and the outcome is disadvantageous for him. By doing
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Figure 2: For a merge-mined blockchain like Namecoin, the PoW is not attached to the Namecoin block
directly. Instead, a parent block (Bitcoin) is constructed that commits to the Namecoin block’s hash,
and the PoW is computed for the parent block. Indirectly, it still depends on the Namecoin block, and
thus can secure it. To seed a PRNG in this situation, the parent block (Bitcoin) should be used (bold)
instead of the Namecoin block itself (dashed).
so, the miner obviously has the opportunity cost of losing the block reward that he would get for the
solved block. But if the stake in a game is high enough, it may still be worthwhile to withhold the block.
The exact game-theoretic incentive structure for miners that also participate in blockchain-based casino
games has been analysed in [14].
For many games, especially if they are small and/or based on a widely used blockchain like Ethereum,
this may be an acceptable risk to take. But for other applications, the risk of a miner manipulating the
randomness through block withholding can be prohibitive.
3.2 Considerations for Merged Mining
An alternative to the direct mining process described above in Subsection 2.1 is merged mining [4].
Pioneered by Namecoin in 2011, this method allows miners of a parent blockchain (like Bitcoin) to also
mine on a merge-mined blockchain like Namecoin “for free”. That way, it is possible for otherwise smaller
blockchains to gain a big amount of hashing power, giving a big boost to their security.
The way how this works is as follows: Instead of computing a PoW for the current Namecoin block
directly, miners construct a Bitcoin block instead, but include a reference to the Namecoin block in
it. Then, if they find a suitable PoW for the Bitcoin block, this proof also commits to the Namecoin
block. The Namecoin network is built in such a way that it accepts this “indirect” PoW as well. This is
illustrated in Figure 2.
Merged mining can be very beneficial for the security of a blockchain. However, its use mandates
a tweak to the use of block hashes to seed PRNGs: Since the PoW is not directly part of the block
itself, the block hash also does not depend on it. This means that a miner can cheaply generate multiple
versions of a block and its block hash, before ever starting the computationally-intensive mining process.
Thus, if the randomness of a game were based on the block hash, the miner could simply generate a
block he likes first and only then start mining. The opportunity cost of block withholding would be
completely removed, making it very easy and cheap to manipulate random numbers.
This problem is straight-forward to fix, though: Instead of basing random numbers off the block
hash, they have to depend on some quantity that itself depends on the actual PoW. So by simply using,
for instance, the block hash of the parent chain, the same opportunity cost as with a non-merge-mined
blockchain is restored. The XAYA blockchain, which can be merge mined with Bitcoin, includes exactly
this fix in its rngseed mechanism.
3.3 Hash Commitments
A completely different method for generating provably-fair randomness in a game is based on hash
commitments. For the simple case of a game between two players (e.g. one of them could be an online
casino), the determination of a random event (e.g. roulette spin) could look like this:
1. Both players choose a secret random number, N1 and N2. The random event’s outcome will be
based on a combination of N1 and N2, e.g. on the hash H(N1|N2) of a concatenation of both.
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2. The players share the hashes of their secrets with each other, H(N1) and H(N2).
3. At this point in time, the secrets and with them the outcome of the random event are fixed. None
of the players can change their value anymore without the other noticing, but none can predict the
the outcome yet without knowing the other’s secret.
4. After both players have chosen a secret and committed to it, both reveal their preimages N1 and
N2. Now both can verify that the other followed the protocol and both can compute and verify
H(N1|N2) to determine the random event independently.
Of course, the full protocol for some game based on this approach will likely also include steps where
the players sign their messages to each other and/or include them in blockchain transactions, but this is
not relevant for the discussion here.
With a protocol like this, both players are guaranteed provably-fair random numbers: As long as the
hash function H is cryptographically secure, none of the players can manipulate or predict the outcome.
Hash-commitment schemes are, of course, not new. They have been proposed for cryptographically-
secure games long before the invention of Bitcoin, for instance in [18]. In the Bitcoin ecosystem,
SatoshiDice [21] was an early gambling platform that utilised hash commitments to provide users with
provably-fair betting. Another, more sophisticated example for the use of hash commitments are the
“Fate Channels” described by FunFair [17].
But while hash-commitment schemes provide provable security against manipulation, they are unfor-
tunately not applicable in all situations. They are good for games between a well-defined set of players
(e.g. just a user and a casino), but they cannot be applied in their basic form for large game worlds
with an unspecified set of (currently online) users like Huntercoin. Of course, users might be allowed
to contribute data that is integrated into the random-number computation also in these situations. But
since it is not known which users can or want to contribute, this has to be optional. Then, however,
miners get back the ability to manipulate the randomness at will, since they will be able to censor reveal
transactions of users which they do not like; ultimately, the miner of a block will again be the first person
to know the outcome, and be able to withhold the block just as discussed above in Subsection 3.1.
4 Betting against Dishonest Miners
As we have seen before in Section 3, none of the existing approaches to random numbers can provide
secure randomness for general blockchain games. The usage of block hashes to seed PRNGs works for
all kinds of games, but unfortunately suffers from the risk of block withholding. This issue, however,
can be fixed by adding an additional feature: Namely by letting users bet “against” miners as first
proposed in [9].
Before we describe this idea in more detail, let us take a brief look at a simple and classical game,
rock-paper-scissors. It is easy to see (a simple overview can be found in [7]) that the optimal strategy for
each player there is to pick each choice randomly with probability 1/3. As soon as one player deviates
from this strategy, she gives an advantage to her opponent who can then exploit the predictability in her
strategy. Thus, ideally each player should be as unpredictable as possible, which means randomising the
choices as much as possible.
The same can be applied also to randomness based on block hashes: In particular, consider a game
where users of a blockchain can bet whether some future block hash will be even or odd. If they bet
correctly, they get some money from the miner who created the block in question (their bet minus some
house edge). If their bet is wrong, the miner instead wins the amount they wagered.
If a miner produces perfectly randomised block hashes (which is automatically the case as long as
he does not engage in block withholding), then this betting game adds some variance to their payout,
but overall they win due to the house edge. But as soon as a miner’s blocks have some kind of bias
and are no longer fully random, the betting users can get an advantage by exploiting this to win money
at the cost of the miner. Thus, the community at large gets an instrument they can apply to punish
dishonest miners and hold them accountable. In the next Section 5, we will analyse this game in detail.
It will turn out in Theorem 15 that its Nash equilibrium is (under certain conditions) indeed such that
the miners will produce blocks that are close to perfectly random instead of withholding them. This
holds true even if some miner has a stake in a game on the blockchain as well, and would benefit from
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manipulating the outcome of random events. Thus, the risk and potential damage of block withholding
is greatly reduced by adding the betting game to the blockchain’s rules.
Before continuing, let us clarify the terms we will use in the future for the different roles that
participants on the blockchain network have:
Miners produce blocks as described in Subsection 2.1. Thus they are also ultimately in charge of
determining the outcome of random events, which are based on their block hashes. They may also
participate in games on the blockchain, and thus have preferences for certain outcomes of those
events.
Users of the blockchain network are, in the context of the following discussion, participants in the
betting game described above. They may bet money against miners, particularly if the block
distribution produced by the miners is not fully random. They may also participate in games on
the blockchain, but this is not relevant for our discussion below.
Players are simply participants in a blockchain game and they are not mining themselves. The main
goal of our proposal is to make sure that players can expect “fair” determination of random events
in the games they play.
We assume that all of these actors are rational, and interested only in maximising their profit from
within the system. For instance, we assume that no-one is discouraged from an action damaging the
blockchain ecosystem (like manipulating randomness) just because it may lower the market value of the
underlying cryptocurrency in which they may hold a stake.
4.1 Simplifying Assumptions
To simplify our analysis, let us assume that there is only one miner (who consequently produces all the
blocks). Similarly, we consider only one betting user in the system. Of course, this is far from what the
reality will be. But if there are multiple agents of each role, then their combined actions will simply
amount to a mixed strategy of the game (described in more detail below in Subsection 5.2). For instance,
if there is one miner who engages in block withholding and one who does not, then this is equivalent to a
single miner who only withholds some blocks. Similarly, if different users on the blockchain bet different
amounts (and perhaps on different outcomes), then only the “net bet” is important for the miners.
Furthermore, the mixed system will tend towards the same equilibrium as the game with only one
miner and one user: If overall, miners are withholding blocks too often, then it will encourage users
(one or multiple) to bet more against them. And then either some of the withholding miners will turn
honest (since they are losing money on those bets), or perhaps more honest miners will join (as they can
benefit from their house edge). In both cases, the overall fraction of withholding will decrease until the
equilibrium is reached, just as a single, rational miner would do. In the same way, overall betting will
converge towards the same equilibrium that a single, rational betting user would choose.
Hence, by restricting ourselves to just one miner and a single user (who can and will choose suitable
mixed strategies), the overall structure of the game is not changed. (A different way to arrive at the
same simplifying assumption is the following: Even if there are multiple miners or users in the system,
all of them will have the same incentives and thus behave in the same way, as long as we assume all
agents to be rational and interested only in maximising their profits.)
The second simplification we want to make concerns the set of in-game events we consider as targets
of miner manipulation and for users to bet on. It is likely that any sufficiently complex blockchain game
will need many different random events in its state-transition rules. And while users can then of course
bet independently on the different events as they wish, a miner’s decision to publish or withhold a block
is “atomic” and cannot be made independently for the different events. But in the end, all that matters
to players is that all events relevant to them have the distribution they should have. And if they do not,
then users will have an incentive to bet against miners until this is fixed. Individually for each event,
this game follows our analysis of Section 5.
4.2 Considerations for a Practical Implementation
It is important to note that it is far from straight-forward to build a practical blockchain that incorpo-
rates an implementation of the betting game described above. At least the following issues need to be
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considered and solved for that:
• User bets will have to be submitted to the network as transactions. They could use some form of
hash commitment to hide details about the bet from miners, but miners may still try to censor those
transactions (i.e. simply not include them in blocks). Particularly miners who want to manipulate
random events may try to do this and block users from holding them accountable. But as long as
a user can bet on blocks far enough into the future, it is enough if any (honest) miner confirms her
transaction before her bet’s target block.
• Even if honest miners win on average in the betting game (thanks to the house edge), this scheme
still increases variance in mining payout and risk for the miners. Thus it may discourage people
from mining—although given that the payout expectation is positive, that remains to be seen.
Miners on such a blockchain are a mixture between miners of a classical blockchain and casino
operators. Since people currently are providing both kinds of services, it seems plausible that there
will also be miners on a blockchain based on our proposal.
• It is not trivial how users can actually win money from the miners, especially if the amounts are
larger than individual block rewards. To implement this, it will likely be necessary for miners to
deposit a large stake of coins in order to be able to produce blocks. Then winnings of users could
be taken out of that deposit. This changes the structure of the underlying system significantly
(compared to existing PoW blockchains), but does not pose any problems that are impossible to
solve. It is important to note here that such a blockchain would still be secured by PoW. Even
though miners are required to stake a deposit, this would be very different from the existing concept
of proof-of-stake mining.
• For generic blockchains like Ethereum or XAYA, there needs to be some mechanism (e.g. EVM
bytecode) to actually define the events that users bet on. For games with their own custom
blockchain (e.g. Huntercoin), the developers can instead predefine a list of events that are likely of
interest to players in the game.
All in all, defining and building a suitable practical implementation requires additional research and
engineering, but is certainly not impossible. This, however, is outside the context of the current paper.
Here, we just want to describe the basic idea and show that it is—in theory—able to align the game-
theoretic incentives correctly.
5 Game-Theoretic Analysis
Let us now take a detailed look at the game-theoretic incentive structure that the proposed betting game
from Section 4 has.
5.1 Basic Setting
Let (Ω,F , P ) be a probability space. (For a general introduction to mathematical probability theory,
see, for instance, Chapter 4 of [2].) This probability space models the outcome of mining one block under
the assumption that no block withholding is taking place. For a blockchain that uses some b-bit hash h
based on the block to determine randomness in games, a typical setting will be
Ω =
{
h
∣∣h ∈ N0, 0 ≤ h < 2b} , F = 2Ω, P (A) = |A|
2b
.
Here, 2Ω denotes the power set of Ω and |A| is the number of elements in the finite set A ⊂ Ω. It is easy
to see that this defines, indeed, a (discrete) probability space. The exact nature of the probability space
is not relevant for our further analysis, though, and can be left unspecified.
Now, let D ∈ F be some fixed event that matters in the blockchain game. In the following, we will
analyse the betting game based on this event. For instance, this could be the set of outcomes that lead to
some particularly important in-game event in an MMO like Huntercoin, or it could be the set of “winning
block hashes” for a casino game like SatoshiDice. Let us denote the probability of D by p := P (D).
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Next, we consider the reward R that the miner gets for the block—this includes his block reward,
but it may also include some winnings (or losses) from in-game events for a miner who also participates
in games. Overall, R is a random variable on our probability space. Since our analysis is focused around
D, let us define the expected miner rewards related to the outcome of this event:
Rd := R0 +Rw := E (R |D) , Rn := R0 := E (R |Ω \D) (1)
Here, Rd, Rn ∈ R are the expected rewards of the miner for blocks that trigger D or not, respectively.
Without loss of generality, we can assume Rd ≥ Rn, i.e. that D is beneficial to the miner. Since
Rd = Rn would make any block withholding and our entire analysis here pointless, we assume furthermore
Rd > Rn. As indicated in (1), we can split the expectation values into an unconditional base block reward
R0 and potential winnings Rw > 0 in the game when D occurs.
5.2 The Betting Game
The process of mining a new block and potentially betting on the outcome of D against the miner (as
described in Section 4) can now be seen as a finite game between two players, the miner and the betting
user.
5.2.1 Choices for the Miner
For the purpose of this analysis, we assume that before constructing the next block, the miner decides
on one of three possible pure strategies:
H The miner can be honest, which means that they will simply broadcast the next block they find,
independently of the outcome of D.
Wd The miner will only broadcast a block where D occurs. He will withhold all blocks that trigger Ω\D
instead. (In other words, the miner withholds to force D, not withholds blocks with D.)
Wn The miner will only broadcast a block where D does not occur. In other words, blocks with D will
be withheld and the next published block will trigger Ω \D. Naively, this strategy has no benefit
for the miner—but since it is a valid choice, we nevertheless include it in our analysis.
Since we assume that we only have one miner, they are able to force the outcome of D for the next
block if they wish (by retrying as often as necessary to find a suitable block). Since creating a block
likely incurs a cost to the miner (except perhaps when merge mining), choosing Wd or Wn as a strategy
has an extra cost. This will be reflected in our payoff function (6) below.
Instead of choosing a pure strategy, the miner can of course also pick a mixed strategy that randomises
between the three available pure strategies. For this case, let us denote the probabilities of the miner
choosing Wd and Wn by ωd and ωn, respectively. Then the set of possible strategies for the miner is
Sm = {(ωd, ωn) |ωd, ωn ∈ [0, 1], ωd + ωn ≤ 1} .
Clearly, the probability for the miner choosing H is 1− ωd − ωn. By definition of Sm, this value is also
non-negative.
Based on which strategy from Sm the miner chooses, the distribution of published blocks may be
different from the underlying probability space. In particular, let us define Pd and Pn to be the proba-
bilities of a mined block triggering D and Ω \D, respectively, under the chosen miner strategy from Sm.
It is easy to see that these quantities are given by
Pd = ωd + (1− ωd − ωn)p, Pn = ωn + (1− ωd − ωn)(1− p) = 1− Pd. (2)
5.2.2 Choices for the Betting User
The user betting against the miner has also three pure strategies available:
A The user can abstain from betting on the outcome of D altogether.
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Bd The user bets a maximum amount bd > 0 on D occurring.
Bn The user bets a maximum amount bn > 0 on Ω \ D occurring. As before, this strategy seems not
very useful at least from a naive point of view (as also the miner has no incentive to force blocks
that do not trigger D), but it is a possible strategy to consider.
Just like the miner, the betting user can now also employ a mixed strategy. We denote the probabilities
of choosing Bd and Bn by λd and λn, respectively, then the set of possible user strategies is given by
Su = {(λd, λn) |λd, λn ∈ [0, 1], λd + λn ≤ 1} . (3)
As before, the non-negative probability of choosing A instead is 1− λd − λn.
Note that opting for a mixed strategy of, say, betting a fixed amount bd with probability λd is (on
average) equivalent to always betting a reduced amount λdbd. (This can be seen from (5) below.) So
instead of defining Su as in (3), we could directly define the user strategy as a pair of non-negative
amounts bet on D and Ω \D. But the definition based on a finite amount of available pure strategies
and mixed strategies based on them fits better to the typical structure of a game-theoretic analysis.
Hence we decided to stick to this form.
5.2.3 Payoff Functions
Let us now take a closer look at the bets that the user can make against the miner. As mentioned above,
when playing the pure strategy Bd, the user bets bd. This means that she loses bd if the bet fails (D does
not occur). If, on the other hand, D takes place, then she should win an appropriate amount such that
the bet is fair (taking the probability p for D into account) and includes a certain house edge  > 0. First
of all, the winning amount should obviously be proportional to the bet. In other words, let the winning
amount be βdbd with some factor of proportionality βd > 0. The correct factor can then be determined
easily, assuming that we want an honest miner to win on average according to the house edge :
Lemma 1. Consider a simple betting game where a user loses the bet b > 0 with probability 1 − p and
wins βb with probability p > 0. If β is chosen as
β =
1− p
p+ 
,
then the expected win is E (W ) = −βb.
Proof. We can simply check that the expectation value is as claimed:
E (W ) = pβb− (1− p)b = (1− p)p− (1− p)(p+ )
p+ 
· b = − (1− p)
p+ 
· b = −βb
Thus, following Lemma 1, we define
βd =
1− p
p+ 
, βn =
p
1− p+  . (4)
This yields the following expression for the expected payoff of the betting user, based on her strategy
(λd, λn) ∈ Su and the probabilities Pd and Pn that depend on the miner’s strategy:
E (U) = λdbd (βdPd − Pn) + λnbn (βnPn − Pd) (5)
For the miner, let us assume that the expected cost of “forcing” a block that triggers D by withholding
all other blocks is given by Cd ≥ 0. Similarly, Cn ≥ 0 shall be the cost of forcing a block where D does
not occur. The values of these parameters depend on p and the concrete situation of the blockchain, e.g.
the mining difficulty and whether or not the blockchain is merge mined. Overall, the payoff for the miner
consists of three parts: First, the expected rewards Rd and Rn for blocks where D and Ω \ D occur,
respectively. Second, the betting game with the user—since this is a zero-sum game, the miner’s payoff
is exactly −U . And third, the costs for forcing a certain outcome through block withholding. Taking all
together, the expected payoff for the miner is
E (M) = PdRd + PnRn − E (U)− ωdCd − ωnCn. (6)
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Figure 3: The two terms βdPd − Pn (blue) and βnPn − Pd (red) for p = 0.4. The probability Pd, which
reflects the miner’s strategy, is on the x-axis.
5.3 Strategy for the Betting User
Since we assume that the betting user acts rationally and purely based on maximising her profit, let us
now consider what strategy choice in Su maximises E (U). For this, we assume that some miner strategy
from Sm is fixed, and that the resulting probabilities Pd and Pn = 1 − Pd are known to the user. In a
real-world setting, these probabilities can simply be determined empirically from an analysis of the last
blocks. A first, trivial conclusion is that there exists a (not necessarily unique) optimal user strategy for
any given miner strategy (we will fully characterise it later in Corollary 4):
Lemma 2. For any Pd ∈ [0, 1], there exists a user strategy (λ∗d, λ∗n) ∈ Su that maximises E (U) over Su.
Proof. This is immediately clear, since Su is compact and E (U) continuous. (See, for instance, Theo-
rem 2.10 in [16].)
From (5), it is easy to see that the best choice of (λd, λn) ∈ Su depends directly on the signs of the
two terms βdPd−Pn and βnPn−Pd. When any one of them is negative, then the corresponding λ should
be chosen as zero to maximise E (U). Otherwise, it should be chosen as large as possible. These terms
are visualised in Figure 3. If the miner-chosen Pd is close to the “natural value” of p = 0.4, then both
terms are negative—this reflects the house edge. But if Pd diverges sufficiently from p to either side, then
the user’s profits from betting on this divergence exceed the house edge. Clearly, the divergence required
to make the terms positive is bigger for a larger house edge (as in Figure 3b). In the limit  → 0+, the
lines intersect at (p, 0). Let us also give a more formal and detailed analysis:
Lemma 3. Let  > 0, p ∈ (0, 1) and Pd ∈ [0, 1]. We set
Pd =
βn
1 + βn
and Pd =
1
1 + βd
, (7)
where βd and βn are defined as in (4). Then
0 < Pd < p < Pd < 1. (8)
In the limit for vanishing or very large house edge, some of these inequalities turn into equations:
lim
→0+
Pd = lim
→0+
Pd = p, lim
→∞Pd = 0, lim→∞Pd = 1
Furthermore,
sgn (βdPd − Pn) = Pd − Pd, sgn (βnPn − Pd) = Pd − Pd. (9)
Here, sgn (·) denotes the three-valued sign function (with sgn (0) = 0).
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Proof. Combining (4) with (7), we find that
Pd =
p
1− p+  ·
1− p+ 
1 + 
=
p
1 + 
, Pd =
(
1− p+ p+ 
p+ 
)−1
=
p+ 
1 + 
.
From these representations, (8) and the stated limits follow easily.
It remains to show (9). For this, note that the following inequalities are equivalent:
βdPd − Pn ≥ 0 ⇔ βdPd ≥ 1− Pd ⇔ Pd ≥ 1
1 + βd
⇔ Pd − Pd ≥ 0
Since the same is true for strict inequalities, the first relation in (9) follows. Similarly,
βnPn − Pd ≥ 0 ⇔ βn(1− Pd) ≥ Pd ⇔ βn
1 + βn
≥ Pd ⇔ Pd − Pd ≥ 0.
Again, this also holds true for strict inequalities, completing the proof.
The values Pd and Pd from Lemma 3 correspond to the points where the red and blue lines in Figure 3,
respectively, intersect the x-axis. They determine the optimal user strategy:
Corollary 4. The set S∗u ⊂ Su of user strategies that maximise E (U) is given as follows:
• If Pd < Pd, then the user can make a profit by betting on Ω \D. Consequently, the unique optimal
strategy is to choose λd = 0 and λn = 1, i.e. S
∗
u = {(0, 1)}.
• If Pd < Pd < Pd, then the user should not bet at all. In this range, the distribution of blocks
produced by the miner is so close to the “true” distribution (determined by p) that the house edge
is larger than any potential winnings. In this case, S∗u = {(0, 0)}.
• If Pd < Pd, then the user can make a profit by betting on D. The user should choose λd = 1 and
λn = 0 to maximise E (U), i.e. S
∗
u = {(1, 0)}.
• For the two “intermediate” cases Pd = Pd and Pd = Pd, the user can choose to bet or not, since the
expected winnings from the skewed distribution will exactly compensate for the house edge. Thus
all strategies with λd = 0 and λn ∈ [0, 1] are optimal for Pd = Pd, i.e. S∗u = {0} × [0, 1]. Similarly,
S∗u = [0, 1]× {0} for Pd = Pd.
Proof. This follows from (5) and Lemma 3.
Note that (8) implies that it is never optimal for the user to bet on both outcomes at the same time
(i.e. λd > 0 and λn > 0). “Hedging the bet” like this always means that she loses unnecessarily much to
the house edge.
5.4 Strategy for the Miner
Also the miner is trying to optimise his profit, i.e. to maximise E (M) by choosing (ωd, ωn) ∈ Sm in the
right way for a given user strategy in Su. Noting that Pn = 1− Pd and using R0 and Rw to express the
block rewards, we can rewrite (6) to:
E (M) = Pd(R0 +Rw) + (1−Pd)R0−E (U)−ωdCd−ωnCn = R0 +PdRw−E (U)−ωdCd−ωnCn (10)
Since R0 is just a constant offset, it is clear that we can, without loss of generality, assume R0 = 0
and use the simplified form (10) for analysing the maximum. (The base block reward R0 is of course
important to incentivise miners in the first place. But for our analysis here, we assume that there is a
miner on the blockchain anyway. For determining his strategy with respect to block withholding, the
value of R0 does not matter.)
A first observation we can make about (10) is the following: The first part of the expression depends
only on Pd, but not directly on ωd or ωn. Only the last two terms (expressing the cost for withholding
blocks) are given based on ωd and ωn directly, and they are always “bad” for maximising the profit.
Furthermore, the miner can achieve an arbitrary value of Pd ∈ [0, 1] with at least one of the two
withholding probabilities set to zero:
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Lemma 5. Let a desired Pd ∈ [0, 1] be given arbitrarily. This value of Pd can be achieved according to
(2) with a miner strategy ω∗ = (ω∗d, ω
∗
n) ∈ Sm, where ω∗d = 0 if Pd ≤ p and ω∗n = 0 if Pd ≥ p.
Furthermore, any other strategy (ωd, ωn) ∈ Sm that yields Pd satisfies ωd > ω∗d and ωn > ω∗n.
Proof. Setting ω∗d = 0 and solving (2) for ω
∗
n yields ω
∗
n = 1 − Pd/p. For Pd ≤ p, we have ω∗n ∈ [0, 1], so
that ω∗ ∈ Sm. Similarly, ω∗n = 0 and ω∗d = (Pd − p)/(1− p) also yield a valid strategy if Pd ≥ p. In the
special situation of Pd = p, both cases result in ω
∗
d = ω
∗
n = 0.
Now let ω = (ωd, ωn) ∈ Sm be another strategy that results in the given value of Pd. For Pd ≤ p,
clearly ωd ≥ ω∗d = 0. Also, solving (2) for ωn, we get
ωn = 1− Pd
p
+
1− p
p
· ωd = ω∗n +
1− p
p
· ωd ≥ ω∗n.
If ωd = ω
∗
d = 0 would be the case, then also ωn = ω
∗
n follows. This contradicts the assumption that
ω∗ 6= ω. Thus ωd > ω∗d and ωn > ω∗n must in fact be true.
For Pd ≥ p, a similar argument shows ωn > ω∗n = 0 and
ωd = ω
∗
d +
p
1− p · ωn > ω
∗
d.
Thus, we can conclude that the optimal miner strategy will be found in the set
S0m = ([0, 1]× {0}) ∪ ({0} × [0, 1]) ⊂ Sm,
where at least one withholding probability is zero:
Corollary 6. E (M) has a maximum over the set Sm. This maximum can be achieved even with
ω∗ ∈ S0m. If Cd, Cn > 0 are strictly positive, then only strategies from S0m can maximise E (M).
Proof. Since Sm is compact and E (M) continuous, it is clear that there exists a maximising strategy
ω ∈ Sm. This strategy has a corresponding optimal value Pd(ω) ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, Lemma 5 implies that
there exists ω∗ ∈ S0m with Pd(ω∗) = Pd(ω). And since ω ≥ ω∗ component-wise according to the lemma,
it follows from Cd, Cn ≥ 0 and (10) that E (M(ω)) ≤ E (M(ω∗)). If Cd, Cn > 0, then ω = ω∗ must
be the case, since otherwise E (M(ω)) < E (M(ω∗)) and that contradicts our assumption of ω being a
maximum.
Note that E (M) is an affine function with respect to ωd and ωn. The coefficients depend on the user
strategy (λd, λn) ∈ Su and the parameters like Rw or Cd. Thus, one can in theory easily compute where
exactly on S0m the optimal miner strategy lies once those coefficients are fixed. In full generality, however,
this is a bit messy and not very enlightening. In the following we will instead consider special cases that
yield more qualitative conclusions as well as results relevant for determining the Nash equilibrium of the
betting game later in Subsection 5.5.
The first property that we can deduce is quite intuitive: If the user bets on Ω \ D, then the miner
should certainly not try to force this outcome. Not only will he lose money to the user, he will also have
costs for doing so and result in lower block rewards than not withholding any blocks (or forcing D).
Lemma 7. Let the user strategy satisfy λd = 0 and assume that ω
∗ = (ω∗d, ω
∗
n) ∈ S0m maximises E (M).
Then necessarily ω∗n = 0.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that ω∗n > 0. Since ω
∗ ∈ S0m, this implies ω∗d = 0. Hence, Pd(ω∗) <
p = Pd(ω0), where ω0 = (0, 0) ∈ S0m corresponds to the miner strategy H of being fully honest and not
withholding any blocks.
For λd = 0 and ωd = 0, the miner payoff (10) simplifies to
E (M) = PdRw − E (U)− ωnCn = PdRw − λnbn(βnPn − Pd)− ωnCn.
The first two terms are strictly increasing in Pd and the last is decreasing in ωn. Hence, it follows that
E (M(ω∗)) < E (M(ω0)), contradicting optimality of ω∗.
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Of course, since D is beneficial to the miner, one may expect the miner to produce blocks that trigger
D more often rather than less often, i.e. Pd ≥ p. Hence, the natural strategy for the betting user
(according Corollary 4) likely has λn = 0 rather than λd = 0. In this case, the optimal miner strategy
depends on the exact relation between the benefit Rw that D has for the miner, the cost Cd for forcing
D and the user’s bet λd. In particular:
Proposition 8. Let λn = 0, Cd, Cn > 0 and define
Λ := λdbd(βd + 1), Λ := Rw − Cd
1− p < Rw +
Cn
p
=: Λ. (11)
Then the set S∗m ⊂ Sm of miner strategies that maximise E (M) is given as follows:
• If Λ < Λ, then the rewards of blocks with D outweigh the costs of forcing them. The miner should
choose ωd = 1 and ωn = 0, i.e. S
∗
m = {(1, 0)}.
• If Λ < Λ < Λ, then the user bets roughly equal the rewards Rw that the miner can achieve with
blocks that trigger D. The costs for forcing either D or Ω\D outweigh any benefits, so the optimal
miner strategy is to be honest with S∗m = {(0, 0)}.
• If Λ < Λ, then user bets on D are so high that the miner can actually benefit the most by forcing
blocks that trigger Ω \D. He should choose ωd = 0 and ωn = 1, i.e. S∗m = {(0, 1)}.
• For the intermediate cases with equality, the miner can choose any mixed strategy between the two
equal choices. In other words, for Λ = Λ, S∗m = [0, 1]× {0}. For Λ = Λ, the optimal strategies are
given by S∗m = {0} × [0, 1].
Proof. For λn = 0, we can rewrite E (M) from (10) as
E (M) = Xdωd +Xnωn +X0,
where the coefficients are given by
Xd = Rw(1− p)− Cd − Λ(1− p),
Xn = Λp−Rwp− Cn,
X0 = Rwp+ λdbd(1− p(βd + 1)).
From these values, it is easy to see that sgn (Xd) = sgn (Λ− Λ) and sgn (Xn) = sgn
(
Λ− Λ). Since
Λ < Λ, at most one of the two can be positive (this matches the result of Corollary 6). The optimal
miner strategies S∗m as stated follow easily.
Let us conclude this subsection with two remarks about Proposition 8: First, note that (4) implies
X0 = Rwp+ βd · λdbd > 0.
Thus, the miner payoff for being honest is always positive and corresponds to what one expects from
Lemma 1. Second, it can of course be the case that not all of the options in Proposition 8 are actually
applicable. For instance, if Rw is very small compared to the cost Cd, then Λ < 0 can be the case. This
means that Wd (forcing blocks that trigger D) is never a good choice for the miner, even if λd = 0.
5.5 Nash Equilibria of the Betting Game
After having analysed the optimal strategies for both the miner and betting user previously, we can now
consider them together. To analyse the general structure of the betting game, we employ the widely-
used concept of Nash equilibria [11]. For a more extensive introduction to this concept, see Chapter 2
of [12]. Roughly speaking, a Nash equilibrium occurs in a game if every player uses the optimal strategy
assuming that all other players stick to their chosen strategy. In other words, when all players choose a
strategy from such an equilibrium point, then none of them has an incentive to unilaterally switch to a
different strategy. In the context of our the betting game, this means (compare Definition 14.1 in [12]):
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Definition 9. A pair of strategies (ω, λ) ∈ Sm × Su is a Nash equilibrium if ω maximises E (M(λ))
over Sm and λ maximises E (U(ω)) over Su.
It is not hard to see that Proposition 20.3 of [12] applies in our situation, showing that a Nash
equilibrium exists. In the remainder of this subsection, however, we will characterise the Nash equilibria
of our betting game more thoroughly. For this, we will assume Cd, Cn > 0. This acts as a kind of
regularisation (see Corollary 6), and will reduce the number of special cases we have to consider.
The first result that we can derive is that the “negative” strategies Wn and Bn, as well as mixed
strategies involving them, can never be part of a Nash equilibrium. This already simplifies our analysis
of the equilibria quite a lot.
Lemma 10. Let (ω, λ) ∈ Sm × Su be a Nash equilibrium. Then necessarily ωn = 0 and λn = 0.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that ωn > 0. According to Corollary 6, this implies ωd = 0. Hence,
Pd < p must be the case (i.e. the miner forces Ω\D to occur more often than it would naturally). In this
situation, Corollary 4 implies λd = 0 for an optimal user strategy. But then Lemma 7 implies ωn = 0,
which is a contradiction.
Now assume λn > 0 instead. Since λ is a maximising strategy for the user, this means per Corollary 4
that Pd < p must be the case. This, in turn, is only possible if ωn > 0. But then we arrive at a
contradiction as in the first part of the proof.
As our next step, we consider a first special case: If the reward Rw for blocks that trigger D is so
small that the cost Cd for forcing them outweighs any benefits for the miner, then the equilibrium point
of the betting game is with the miner acting honestly and the user not betting at all. In this case,
random numbers will be fair simply because the miner has no sufficient incentive to fiddle with them.
(Just as they would be fair in this situation without a betting game.)
Proposition 11. Assume that Rw < Cd/(1− p). Then the unique Nash equilibrium of the betting game
is ωd = ωn = λd = λn = 0, i.e. the pure strategy (H,A).
Proof. Note that our assumption together with (11) implies Λ < 0, so that Λ < Λ is always the case for
Proposition 8. Let (ω, λ) ∈ Sm×Su be a Nash equilibrium. Then Lemma 10 implies ωn = λn = 0. Thus
we can conclude from Proposition 8 that ωd = 0 must be the case as well. Consequently Pd = p, so that
λd = 0 follows from Corollary 4.
It remains to verify that (H,A) actually is a Nash equilibrium. (This follows also from the known
existence of an equilibrium, but it is not hard to check directly.) For ωd = ωn = 0, Pd = p. Thus
λ = (0, 0) is indeed an optimal strategy for the user according to Corollary 4. The other way round, for
λd = λn = 0 and Λ < Λ, the case Λ < Λ = 0 < Λ is active in Proposition 8, implying that ω = (0, 0) is
the optimal miner strategy. This completes the proof.
The second special case is where Rw is large enough to incentivise block withholding, but where also
the maximum bet bd is so small that even if the user bets that maximum, then the miner still benefits
by forcing all blocks to trigger D. In the extreme case bd = 0, this corresponds to the typical situation
where block hashes are used for random numbers but no betting game is there at all.
Proposition 12. Assume 0 < bd(βd + 1) < Rw − Cd/(1− p). Then the unique Nash equilibrium of the
betting game is ωn = λn = 0 and ωd = λd = 1, i.e. the pure strategy (Wd, Bd).
Proof. As before, let (ω, λ) ∈ Sm × Su be a Nash equilibrium and recall that ωn = λn = 0 must be the
case according to Lemma 10. In the situation we consider, Λ < Λ is always the case (for all possible
λd ∈ [0, 1]). Thus Proposition 8 implies ωd = 1. Then Pd = 1, so that the optimal user strategy is
λd = 1 according to Corollary 4. Using the same results, we can also easily verify that the pair of pure
strategies (Wd, Bd) actually is a Nash equilibrium.
We can now also consider the case between the two previous extremes. In that situation, the equi-
librium is given by a mixed strategy:
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Proposition 13. Let 0 < Rw−Cd/(1−p) < bd(βd+ 1) be the case. Then the betting game has a unique
Nash equilibrium at a mixed strategy between (H,A) and (Wd, Bd). In particular, ωn = λn = 0 and
ωd =

1 + 
, λd =
1
bd(βd + 1)
(
Rw − Cd
1− p
)
. (12)
Proof. Assume that (ω, λ) ∈ Sm × Su is a Nash equilibrium. Then Lemma 10 implies ωn = λn = 0.
Consequently also Pd ≥ p. Next, consider (7) and note that Pd = Pd if and only if ωd is chosen as in
(12). Assume for a moment that ωd is larger, which means Pd > Pd. Then Corollary 4 implies that
λd = 1 must be the case for an equilibrium point as per Definition 9. Hence Λ < Λ is the case in (11) for
the situation we consider. But then ωd = 0 according to Proposition 8, which contradicts Pd > Pd > p.
So consider the situation that ωd is smaller, i.e. Pd < Pd. Then Corollary 4 implies λd = 0, so that
Λ = 0 < Λ in Proposition 8. Thus ωd = 1 must be the case for an optimal miner strategy, but that
contradicts Pd < Pd as it would imply Pd = 1. Hence we have shown Pd = Pd, which means that ωd
must be as in (12).
Similarly, note that λd matches (12) if and only if Λ = Λ in (11). Assume that Λ < Λ would be the
case. Then Proposition 8 implies ωd = 1. For Λ < Λ, ωd = 0 follows. Both contradict the already shown
form of ωd according to (12), though, so that Λ = Λ must be the case. Thus we have shown that the
Nash equilibrium (ω, λ) necessarily has the form claimed in (12).
It remains to show that (12) is also sufficient for (ω, λ) being a Nash equilibrium. For this, note
first that ωd and λd from (12) are both valid strategy choices in (0, 1). As noted already above, they
furthermore imply exactly Pd = Pd and Λ = Λ. Thus, it follows from Corollary 4 that λd is optimal for
ωd (in fact, any λd ∈ [0, 1] would be optimal). Similarly, Proposition 8 implies that also ωd (and in fact
any ωd ∈ [0, 1]) is optimal for λd. Thus, (ω, λ) is a Nash equilibrium according to Definition 9.
The equilibrium point from (12) can be interpreted as follows: Due to the positive benefit Rw that
the miner has for blocks that trigger D, he has an incentive to slightly prefer those blocks instead of
producing fully random outcomes. But since the user is able to bet against the miner, she will do so
to make a profit from the knowledge that D blocks are more frequent than they should be. In the end,
the miner skews the distribution just so much that the losses to the betting user equal the benefits from
Rw. For the user, on the other hand, the winnings thanks to the skewed distribution are just equal to
the miner’s house edge. In this situation, the miner benefits compared to a situation without any block
withholding and without any bets, and the user enjoys “free betting”. Furthermore, the situation is even
beneficial for miners that are honest and not interested in block withholding in the first place: They
benefit from a non-zero amount of bets being made; the profit they make due to the house edge is exactly
equal to the benefit they could get from manipulating the randomness and exploiting Rw instead.
Finally, it remains to consider the situations exactly on the border between the previous three cases.
For them, it will turn out that there are multiple equilibrium points. That is because the user strategy
will be on the boundary of its domain (λd ∈ {0, 1}). With active constraints, the user’s strategy choice
is less flexible, so that multiple miner strategies can be optimal at the same time.
Proposition 14. Let us denote the set of Nash equilibria of the betting game by Σ∗ ⊂ Sm × Su.
If Rw = Cd/(1− p), then
Σ∗ =
{
(ωd, 0, λd, 0)
∣∣∣∣λd = 0, 0 ≤ ωd ≤ 1 + 
}
. (13)
For 0 < bd(βd + 1) = Rw − Cd/(1− p), we have
Σ∗ =
{
(ωd, 0, λd, 0)
∣∣∣∣λd = 1, 1 +  ≤ ωd ≤ 1
}
. (14)
Proof. Let us first consider the case Rw = Cd/(1− p), and let (ω, λ) ∈ Sm × Su be a Nash equilibrium.
Then clearly ωn = λn = 0 according to Lemma 10. Furthermore, in this case we have Λ = 0. If λd > 0,
then also Λ > 0 as well. Hence Λ < Λ implies ωd = 0 through Proposition 8. But then Pd = p and thus
λd = 0 according to Corollary 4. This is a contradiction, so that λd = 0 must necessarily be true. But
λd = 0 is only an optimal strategy according to Corollary 4 if Pd ≤ Pd. This, in turn, is equivalent to
ωd ≤ /(1 + ). Hence, (ω, λ) is indeed in the right-hand side of (13).
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Next, let (ω, λ) be in the right-hand side of (13). We have to show that it is actually a Nash
equilibrium. Since λd = 0, we know that Λ = Λ = 0. Thus, any value for ωd corresponds to an optimal
miner strategy as per Proposition 8. For ωd ≤ /(1 + ), we know that Pd ≤ Pd as before. Hence, λd = 0
is an optimal strategy for the user according to Corollary 4.
The second case to consider is bd(βd + 1) = Rw − Cd/(1 − p). Let (ω, λ) be a Nash equilibrium.
If λd < 1, then Λ < Λ. Hence ωd = 1 must be the case for an optimal miner strategy according to
Proposition 8. But then Pd = 1, so that λd < 1 cannot be optimal per Corollary 4. Hence, λd = 1 must
be the case. This, however, is only optimal if Pd ≥ Pd, which in turn is equivalent to ωd ≥ /(1 + ).
Thus, (ω, λ) must be in the right-hand side of (14).
Finally, consider any (ω, λ) in the right-hand side of (14). From λd = 1, it follows that Λ = Λ. Hence,
any ωd yields an optimal miner strategy as per Proposition 8. Also, the lower bound that we have on
ωd implies Pd ≥ Pd, so that λd = 1 is actually optimal for the user according to Corollary 4. Thus,
(ω, λ) ∈ Σ∗. This completes the proof.
With the previous results, we have now fully characterised the Nash equilibria of our betting game
in various situations. Note that the miner withholding ωd is always bounded away from one in a Nash
equilibrium, except if bd is too small. But since bd is just a parameter of the system, it can be chosen
large enough to enable a meaningful betting game against miner withholding. Hence, we can conclude
that the betting game is indeed efficient at ensuring that the randomness in our blockchain game is close
to perfectly fair:
Theorem 15. Assume Cd, Cn > 0 and that bd is chosen large enough, i.e. such that
bd(βd + 1) > Rw − Cd
1− p . (15)
Then for any Nash equilibrium of the betting game,
0 ≤ ωd ≤ 
1 + 
and p ≤ Pd ≤ p+ 
1 + 
. (16)
In particular, Pd will be arbitrarily close to p if the house edge  is chosen small enough.
Proof. For the case of (15), one of Proposition 11, Proposition 13 or the first part of Proposition 14
applies. All of them yield ωn = 0 and ωd as in (16). The bound on Pd from (16) follows then immediately
by (2). Finally, it is also easy to see that Pd → p from above as → 0+.
Figure 4 shows numerical values for the bounds on the deviation of Pd from the true p according to
(16). The three lines correspond to different values of p. It can be seen that the betting game is most
efficient in reducing the miner-created skew in the distribution of D if D is likely to occur, and least
efficient for events that occur rarely. This can be explained by the fact that block withholding has the
most effect for the miner if the event would naturally occur only infrequently. But it can also be seen
that even a huge house edge of 10% only makes a 50-50 event occur 55% instead of 50% of the time. For
a more competitive house edge of 1%, this deviation drops to just slightly more than 0.5%. For most
random events in games, this is barely noticeable—and definitely a lot better than the situation without
betting, where the miner would (if only interested in profit) force the event to occur 100% of the time
instead.
6 Conclusion
The current state of the art for randomness in blockchain games relies on one of two methods, using
block hashes to seed PRNGs or basing random events on hash commitments from the players. We
have discussed that both approaches have drawbacks under certain circumstances and for certain types
of games. However, randomness from block hashes can be improved by introducing a special betting
game. Using game theory, we have shown that this game leads to Nash equilibria where the observed
distribution for a certain random event matches the expected, fair distribution quite well. In other words,
introducing our betting game changes the incentive structure for miners in such a way that they will no
longer manipulate the randomness completely. Instead, the game will be much fairer for every player.
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Figure 4: The deviation of Pd from p in the Nash equilibrium according to Theorem 15. The house edge
 is on the x-axis. The y-axis shows the upper bound for Pd − p = |Pd − p|.
We believe that this is a very interesting result. It shows that it is possible to use game-theoretic
incentives to produce fair “randomness” in a deterministic context like a blockchain. Our analysis from
Section 5 has proven the general idea to work. However, research in this topic is of course not complete
yet. In our opinion, there are two main directions where further work would be very interesting and
useful:
First, we made a lot of assumptions for the analysis here (see Subsection 4.1). Further work is required
to remove those and check whether our results still hold in more general contexts. Particularly interesting
would be an analysis with more agents than just one miner and one user. Also important is work on a
situation where there is more than one event. For the latter, betting could still be done on individual
events. But the miner strategy would consist of a full probability distribution on Ω, likely deviating from
the natural distribution given by P . A full analysis of this situation will require different mathematics
from the current paper and would be heavier in topics like functional analysis and measure theory. Hence,
it should be done in a separate paper. We believe that this would not change the fundamental results,
though. It is conceivable that there would still be one particular event or outcome that maximises the
miner’s benefit Rw, so that the miner strategy would then still be focused on withholding blocks just for
this particular event. Finally, a third assumption we made is that the betting user actually knows Rw.
This is not the case (at least not exactly) for a real-world implementation, since it depends heavily on
how the miner is involved in the game himself (and if at all). So the analysis could be adapted to be
more probabilistic in nature, e.g. using Bayesian game theory. In the end, however, only the value of Pd
matters for the user strategy—and that one can be observed empirically. So at least if the system still
tends towards some kind of equilibrium, this will yield the same results as our current analysis.
Second, it remains to implement and test our proposal in a real-world system. Only that can show
whether or not agents will really behave as analysed and thus produce good randomness. We have
already listed the main issues to overcome for such an implementation above in Subsection 4.2. For such
a test, it is interesting to note that random numbers can in theory be separated from mining: Instead
of basing them off a block hash and putting miners in charge, there could be a separate class of agents
that are just responsible for producing random numbers. That would, of course, reduce the costs Cd and
Cn drastically and thus make the system even more susceptible to manipulation. But the betting game
may still be able to rectify the incentives even in such a system. The advantage of an implementation
like that is that it could be done on top of an existing blockchain, e.g. in an Ethereum smart contract
or a game on the XAYA platform. There would be no need to build a blockchain from scratch. Getting
real-world results for how the betting game behaves in such a system would be very interesting.
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